Inside the Texas Gameplan: Season review

Surveying the wreckage.

As we examine the last game of Texas’ 2014 regular season, we have to start with the absolute mess that was the offensive performance. I’ve been lenient with Watson’s execution this year up to now, understanding both the horrendous conditions he’s faced as well as his often solid strategies for winning games, but this gameplan was an absolute wreck.

Just before the first snap of the game, the TCU 4-2-5 D rotated into this look:

That’s nine, count’em, nine defenders in the box. The strong safety is hanging out on the field edge while the boundary corner has force responsibilities to the short side of the field. Meanwhile run-stuffing free safety Derrick Kindred is within seven yards ready to pounce as an unblocked defender in the alley.

Had Texas been able to successfully block TCU’s very good front 6 regularly in this game, and they weren’t, that still leaves a very solid player totally free to wreck the play.

This approach by TCU was entirely predictable, as I wrote in this space before the game, “they are going to outnumber and smother whatever it is you do best, starting with the run game.”

So what do you do when an opponent outnumbers your run game in such a brazen fashion?

One obvious possibility is to try and spread them out in order to prevent them from so easily stacking numbers near the box and turning the line of scrimmage into a mosh pit. Texas attempted to do this, but TCU was totally content to still bring extra defenders either in the form of a safety sneaking into the box late or the deep safeties playing flat-footed and aggressive against the run.

Watson also attempted his various motion strategies to try and create leverage but when the opponent has three essentially interchangeable safeties on the field who go 5-foot-10, 210; 6-foot-0, 215; and 6-foot-2, 195 and can all tackle, that’s not really possible. They responded to UT’s shifting strength by shrugging their shoulders and making simple checks with their versatile secondary.

So the alignment tricks to create leverage for the run game didn’t work.

Then there are tactical responses, like attacking them them with the POP plays (play-option pass) that allow Swoopes to punish over-aggressive safeties with quick throws. Unfortunately, Texas mostly carried quick slant options into the gameplan that Swoopes has struggled to connect on all season.

On one occasion, they allowed him to try and fit a quick out route between the hard-charging strong safety and a trap corner and Swoopes threw a terrific ball, then Texas didn’t run that play again.

The most obvious way to punish a team for playing so many defenders tight in the box is to make their corners prove they can hold up against your receivers. Texas threw deep two or three times while the game was still in question and one of these attempts was a 3rd down quick lob to Foreman that very much felt like a “take a half-hearted attempt and if it doesn’t work we’ll just punt” type of call.

Let’s just pause here for a moment.

TCU has two very good linebackers on the field at all times, a very good DT tandem, and three safeties that will not hesitate to stuff your runner in the alley. TCU’s cornerbacks? A couple of 5-foot-10, 170-pounders with bull’s-eyes on their jerseys.

Meanwhile Texas was fielding two blazing fast WRs that are both bigger than those two in Army Foreman and Marcus Johnson, as well as a massive outside receiver in John Harris. Swoopes can throw the ball about half a mile and has definitely thrown a few good deep balls in his time in Austin.

Yet Texas didn’t feel that in the midst of repeated 3-and-outs and a momentum-less game that taking deep shots that would maximize Texas’ strengths, attack TCU’s weaknesses, and counter Patterson’s strategies were the best strategy.

That’s troubling. If you aren’t controlling the ball anyways, why not take some shots?

Another solution I endorse that Texas attempted was to use Daje to create misdirection and attack multiple points of the line of scrimmage. They’re packing every body close to the line? Hit them at multiple points and if you get something through you can make them pay dearly.

Texas did this a few times with an inside zone plays where Daje was involved on a WR sweep. Here’s the way that teams like Wisconsin have run the jet sweep as a complement to inside zone and unleashed special players like Melvin Gordon:

Running this version of the play you’d get two lead blockers on the edge for Daje, which is either going to cause their linebackers and safeties to widen out pretty quick or else they’ll have to play it very aggressively with their defensive end and hope he can make the tackle. With either response you can punish them with the running back going up the gut behind double teams.

Here’s how Texas ran it with Daje Johnson:

The Texas version is trying to put that defensive end in conflict, a player that is arguably the easiest player to block on TCU’s roster, and doesn’t account for how easily that weak safety can get in on the action due to his range and proximity.

That’s apparently the only Daje Johnson play we have and we don’t even use the industry-standard sweep play that would make him a truly terrifying threat.

Anyways this didn’t work due to poor blocking and Daje was not a featured part of the plan to attack TCU’s aggressiveness. I get frustrated discussing how simple it should be to involve Daje Johnson in this offense so let’s move on.

The primary Watson plan? Attacking TCU’s linebackers in coverage with slot receivers like some kind of Air Raid spread team, in keeping with Texas’ offensive identity this season…

Watson’s favorite way to do this was either by releasing the backs downfield rather than simply into the flats, which was fairly effective, or by lining up Harris as the innermost slot receiver to either side of the formation so he could be matched up on a linebacker or a safety. From this alignment, he would then run short option routes underneath.

Matching Harris with All-Big 12 players Kindred, Paul Dawson, and Sam Carter on short routes yielded a day in which he caught five balls for 39 yards and Swoopes threw for four interceptions and nearly a fifth had Harris not batted it away.

That’s what happens when you gameplan to play it safe against good zone matching defenses with lots of quick routes underneath that are easy to diagnose and no deep shots. We saw this same story play out to our disadvantage in the 2009 Big 12 Championship game…so did Watson come to think of it.

So again to summarize: Texas was playing a team that had very good safeties and linebackers and was packing them in tight to the line of scrimmage while daring Texas to beat two small corners on the outside playing without help. Watson’s toolbox included some very fast players, a very big receiver, and an inexperienced QB who’s easily rattled but has a cannon arm.

Watson’s response was to attack the best players on ground of their own choosing. That this went poorly should shock no one.

You got the sense after the game that the staff was frustrated by Swoopes’ horrifying play and felt he had failed to prepare well enough to execute something that might have worked. Well, that might very well be true, but you can’t tell me that this was the best gameplan to help that kid out.

Let’s move on to the defense, which played exceptionally well and wins that game if supported by competent offense.

The game plan to attack Boykin was even fiercer than what Petty faced in Austin back in October and Boykin was more lucky than wise with some of the decisions he made while under duress.

In this game, Texas revealed the full majesty of a 3-3-5 defense against a spread opponent when the defensive backfield is loaded with big, fast, versatile athletes, who can play fast in multiple roles.

Texas played cover 0 (no deep safeties), cover 3 with strong or weak safety rotation into the box, cover 2, some fire zone cover 3, and another version of rolled over cover 3 that included a middle of the field spy on the QB. That spy, who was usually Edmond or Hughes, would track Boykin, keep him boxed in to the pocket, and then close on him. Texas has improved in this coverage significantly since they used it against Waters (K-State) and Hill (BYU) earlier in the year.

Texas really mucked up Boykin’s option reads on TCU’s favorite running plays, speed option and the zone read, by confusing TCU about who the defensive end was going to be.

The 3-3-5 would regularly rotate into a 4-3 Under front with the backside defensive end and the extra run defender dropping down late to confuse the QB’s option read and provide Texas the numbers and leverage to tackle the pitch man or runner.

On a zone read play, Boykin has to recognize after the snap that the defensive end crashing inside is not his read but the Fox linebacker (or mike linebacker, or safety as the case may be) dropping off the edge is actually who he needs to be reading.

If he and his blockers get that right, they still have to deal with the extra run defender who’s dropped down in the box and typically flowing unimpeded to the football.

This defense makes it very, very difficult for QBs to easily identify where their match-up advantages are, for OL to get their blocking assignments right, and for the offense to account for all the athletes on defense.

Meanwhile, the variety of fronts, coverages, and blitzes that Texas has shown from the defense mean that UT has a lot of bullets in the gun to handle different play-calls from the offense. They also generally have one of Dylan Haines or Jason Hall lined up deep to ensure that no big plays occur. As that safety talent gets better and more experienced, they’ll begin to accumulate a good deal of interceptions and turnovers playing behind a havoc-creating front.

All in all, this game indicated that Texas’ staff is excelling at creating and wielding a defense that can make life miserable for an opposing team, including the dangerous and dreaded Big 12 offenses.

On the other hand, the staff wasn’t able to leverage any advantages on offense and their charges completely gave the game away. As the roster is filled out and developed it’s unlikely that things will ever be this bad on offense again but Watson better prove that he can better utilize the athletes on campus in the future or he’ll fail in his fundamental task to control the ball and take advantage of opportunities afforded by this defense.

If he’s not up for that task there will be dozens of candidates that will be.